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clear.5 9 If existing principles covering subpoenaes are ex-
tended to cover this area,60 the courts will require the IRS to
show a reasonable expectation that the depositors' names will
shed light on an investigation into possible tax liability,
rather than provide information for a mere research project,
and will weigh that expectation against the burden of com-
pliance on the bank.61
Henry J. Miltenberger, Jr.
OVERDRAFT LIABILITY OF JOINT ACCOUNT COSIGNATORIES
In 1974 the Louisiana legislature enacted a portion of the
Uniform Commercial Code' as Title 10 of the Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes and entitled it the Commercial Laws. 2 One of
the purposes of the adoption was to promote uniformity with
other jurisdictions with respect to commercial paper and cer-
tain commercial transactions. 3 The manner in which the
jurisprudence of different states has approached the liability,
under Article 4 of the U.C.C., of joint checking account de-
positors for overdrafts drawn by their cosignatories should
prove a useful guide to Louisiana practitioners and courts in
59. In Humble the IRS admitted the crucial facts on the stand, an oc-
currence not usually available. 488 F.2d at 955.
60. See United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968).
61. See, e.g., discussion in text supra at notes 18-21; United States v.
Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974). Precedent exists for evaluating
administrative summonses by use of a balancing process. E.g., Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (weighing the public and
private interests involved); United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp. 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (specifically weighed the burden of compliance against the
likelihood of uncovering tax liability and denied enforcement).
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1972 Official Text, The American Law
Institute-National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.I.
2. La. Acts 1974, No. 92 § 1.
3. Id.: "AN ACT-To amend the Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding
thereto a new Title 10 entitled Commercial Laws, relating to commercial
paper and certain commercial transactions, contracts and other documents
concerning them,.... to promote uniformity of the law with respect thereto ..."
(emphasis added). To achieve the desired uniformity Louisiana courts should
look to other states' application of the U.C.C. This will not be possible when a
change was made in the U.C.C. text to conform with existing Louisiana
jurisprudence. E.g., LA. R.S. 10:4-402 (Supp. 1974).
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considering similar problems under Chapter 4 of Title 10 and
hopefully will aid in the attainment of uniformity sought in
the Code's adoption. 4
The law is well settled that an overdraft is in effect a loan
by a bank to its customer who, by the act of drawing the
check against nonexistent funds, promises to repay the loan. 5
Subsection 4-401(1)6 of the U.C.C. permits a bank to charge
overdrafts to a customer's account, 7 but does not require the
bank to do so." However, whether an overdraft may be
charged by a bank against all signers of a joint checking
account that has been overdrawn is not clear from the lan-
guage of § 4-401(1). Commentators have suggested that a
bank is empowered by the broad language of Article 4 to
charge all signers on the account for the full amount of an
overdraft; 9 they base their argument upon § 4-401(1), which
does not speak in terms of charging the drawer but rather
charging the account itself, as well as upon the expansive
definitions of "customer" and "account" found in Article 4.10
The first court to confront the problem of a cosignatory's
liability under the U.C.C. for an overdraft in a joint checking
account rejected the commentators' broad construction. In
National Bank of Slatington v. Derhammer, I,11 the plaintiff
4. Chapter 4 of Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes is a near in
toto enactment of U.C.C. Article 4. Hereafter all references to the U.C.C. will
apply to the Louisiana counterpart in Title 10; any differences that may exist
will be noted.
5. E.g., Bracket v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 56 S.E.2d 486 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949);
Caddo Trust & Say. Bank v. Bush, 182 So. 397 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Title
Guar. & Trust Co. v. Emadee Realty Corp., 136 Misc. Rep. 328, 240 N.Y.S. 36
(Sup. Ct. 1930); FDIC v. Ciaffoni, 176 Pa. Super. 91, 107 A.2d 211 (1954).
6. U.C.C. 4-401(1): "As against its customer, a bank may charge against
his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account
even though the charge creates an overdraft" (emphasis added).
7. City Bank v. Tenn, 469 P.2d 816 (Hawaii 1970); Citizens Nat'l
Bank v. Fort Lee Say. & L. Ass'n, 89 N.J. Super. 43, 213 A.2d 315 (1965).
8. 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.C.C. 385 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as HAWKLAND].
9. See HAWKLAND, 385-86; Halls & Hauenstein, The Uniform Commercial
Code in Minnesota: Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 1027, 1041 (1965).
10. Section 4-104 defines the terms "account" and "customer." "Account"
means "any account with a bank and includes a checking, time, interest, or
savings account." "Customer" means "any person having an account with a
bank or for whom a bank has agreed to collect items and includes a bank
carrying an account with another bank."
11. 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 286 (1958).
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bank sought to recover a deficit of $2,950 from a cosignatory
of a joint account. Since the complaint did not specify which
cosignatory had drawn the overdraft nor which one had re-
ceived the funds, 12 the trial court sustained the defendant's
motion for a more specific pleading. The plaintiff there con-
tended that the petition was sufficiently specific because the
broad language of §§ 4-104 and 4-2121' dictates that each cosig-
natory to an account is personally liable for transactions by
his cosignatory that result in an overdraft. However, in ac-
cord with decisions rendered both before 14 and after15 adop-
tion of the U.C.C., the court held that a cosignatory can be
held liable beyond the balance in the account only in two
instances: when he was responsible for the negotiation of the
check, or when he was enriched through the creation of the
overdraft. 1 6 The court reasoned that the language of Article 4
does not burden a cosignatory with a partnership type of
liability whereby all the assets of the cosignatory could be
held for the actions of the other cosignatory.
The plaintiff filed an amended complaint, 7 alleging that
negligent and fraudulent representations by the defendant
caused the bank to overdraw the account. 8 The trial court
12. The complaint alleged that the account had been opened with a check
in the amount of $4,950 drawn upon a fictitious bank, that the bank had paid
the "defendant or her cosignatory" $150 in cash against the check and had
also paid to "account owners" on a check signed by "one of the joint makers"
in the amount of $2,800, and that the check drawn upon the fictitious bank
was returned. The suit was instituted to recover the resultant $2,950 over-
draft. Under § 4-212 when a bank makes a provisional settlement with a cus-
tomer on an item which subsequently is not paid, the bank may revoke the
settlement, charge the item back against the account for the amount of any
credit given for it, or obtain a refund from the customer. Such a charge-back
under § 4-212 would be an "item which is properly payable from the account"
under § 4-401(1) and thus may be effected even when it results in an over-
draft.
13. The court noted that § 4-212 subjects a customer to refund upon
dishonor of a collection item while § 4-104 defines customer as "any person
having an account." 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 286, 289 (1958).
14. See Faulkner v. Bank of Italy, 69 Cal. App. 370, 231 P. 380 (1924); First
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Raynor, 90 S.E.2d 894 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1956).
15. Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1975).
16. 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 286, 289 (1958).
17. National Bank of Slatington v. Derhammer, 11, 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 290
(1958).
18. This new complaint alleged that the defendant had introduced the
fraudulent cosignatory to bank officials and "falsely and fraudulently rep-
resented with intent to deceive the plaintiff that the defendant had known
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overruled the defendant's demurrer1 9 to this complaint and
ordered her to answer on the merits. 20 Thus, the trial court
expanded the situations in which a cosignatory could be held
personally liable for another's overdraft on their joint ac-
count to include a third class of instances when the cosigna-
tory's own negligence or fraud induces the bank to create the
overdraft. A subsequent case did not recognize clearly the
exception, recognized in Derhammer, II, for instances in
which the cosignatory's fraud or negligence induced the bank
to handle the overdraft item. 21 Arguably, such a situation
establishes the cosignatory as having participated in the
negotiation of the check. Use of three exceptions, however,
results in a more accurate expression of the reasons for plac-
ing personal liability upon a non-drawer cosignatory and
should be applied so that a court's basis for establishing lia-
bility will be clear.
The limitation of the liability of a cosignatory to the bal-
ance of the joint account unless he-falls within one of these
three limited exceptions seems to be a correct interpretation
of the U.C.C. To construe the Code to impose liability on each
cosignatory of a joint account for all overdrafts would in
effect establish an implied partnership without limit as to the
liability of one signatory for loans obtained by another. From
the language of § 4-401(1) it is not clear whether the drafters
of the Code contemplated the liability of a cosignatory for an
overdraft in a joint account. 22 Since doubt exists as to
said [cosignatory] all of her life and was engaged to be married to the said
[cosignatory] and that she impliedly represented that [he] was a man of good
moral character, whereas, in fact his character was bad which fact was
known or should have been to defendant." Also, it was alleged that not only
was the $4,950 check drawn upon a fictitious bank, but that the defendant
knew or should have known that fact. 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 291.
19. A demurrer is a method of disputing the sufficiency in law of the
pleading of the opponent; the legal consequences of those facts alleged by the
opponent, if true, are not of a nature to require an answer or further proceed-
ings. E.g., Mountain Park Institute v. Lovill, 198 N.C. 642, 153 S.E. 114, 116
(1930); Green v. Carter, 28 Ohio App. 492, 162 N.E. 814, 815 (1927); State v.
Broad River Power Co., 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41 (1935).
20. 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 290, 291 (1958). For additional discussion of both
National Bank of Slatington v. Derhammer, I and II, see Del Duca, Commer-
cial Code Litigation, 66 DICK. L. REV. 39, 50-51 (1961).
21. See Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1975).
22. Cf. HAWKLAND 385.
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whether the problem was examined fully in the development
of the U.C.C., one should not conclude from definitional lan-
guage that the drafters of the Code intended to imply such a
partnership in a joint account. Clearly, however, when a joint
account arises under a principal and agent relationship, the
normal principal and agent rules should apply to determine
the liability of the cosignatories. 23 Thus, the rationale limit-
ing a non-drawer cosignatory's liability to the balance in the
account should not apply when one consignatory's actions
legally bind the other due to a particular relationship such as
that which exists in a marriage under a community property
regime. 24
The analysis of a non-drawer cosignatory's personal lia-
bility does not end here, however, since § 4-103 permits the
effects of Article 4 to be varied by agreement. 25 This ability to
vary the effects of Article 4 perhaps explains the relatively
few cases involving it.26 Thus, the liability of a cosignatory, in
most instances, is probably fixed by contracts such as indem-
nification agreements in which a cosignatory to a joint ac-
23. See Torrance Nat'l Bank v. Enesco Fed. Credit Union, 285 P.2d 737
(Cal. Ct. App. 1955). Here a principal was held not liable for an overdraft
created by a check drawn by his agent in the absence of express, implied, or
apparent authority of the agent to borrow money or create an overdraft in
the principal's checking account. The bank received the items drawn by the
agent which created the overdraft due to the agent's representation that he
could not otherwise adequately carry on his principal's business. It was never
shown whether the principal actually benefited or was enriched by the crea-
tion of the overdraft. When the principal is enriched, he should be liable to
the bank just as any other cosignatory despite the agent's lack of authority
to bind the principal. Arguably, the other two exceptions, when they exist in
the principal and agent situation, would serve as a basis for apparent author-
ity in the agent to bind the principal. Thus, the usual analysis applies, but
only within the framework of agency rules.
24. Cf. Bremen Bank & Trust Co. v. Bogdan, 498 S.W.2d 306 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973). In this case a wife was held liable for an overdraft in a joint checking
account (her husband's business account) with the determination that the
facts were sufficient to support the finding that she was a joint tenant under
Missouri law; no reference was made to Article 4 of the U.C.C. which was in
force in Missouri at the time of the court's decision.
25. U.C.C. § 4-103(1).
26. See Clontz, How Article 4 Has Fared in the Courts, 4 U.C.C. LAW
JOURNAL 16, 20-21 (1971). This author suggests that the general public's and
possibly the general practitioners' lack of familiarity with Article 4 and the
recent adoption of the article by nearly half the jurisdictions in the nation
explains the few number of cases arising under it.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
count agrees to indemnify a bank for any and all losses suf-
fered by the bank on the account. 27 The U.C.C. provides a
definition for "agreement" as used in § 4-103,2s while Title 10
of the Revised Statutes does not. 29 Louisiana R.S. 10:1-10330
provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions
of this Title, the other laws of Louisiana shall apply." Since
Title 10 does not define "agreement" or "contract," 31 the gen-
eral obligations law will determine if an agreement establish-
ing the overdraft liability of a cosignatory on a joint account
is effective in Louisiana. A valid Louisiana checking account
agreement between the cosignatories of a joint account and a
bank,32 wherein each party agrees to indemnify the bank for
27. Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1975). When the
signatory who is responsible for the overdraft refuses to repay the "loan,"
the bank suffers a loss. The cosignatory's agreement to "indemnify" the bank
must be intended to enable the bank to seek collection from him for the loss
resulting from non-payment of the overdraft, not simply to authorize the
bank to honor the checks of either cosignatory beyond one-half of the balance
of the account. See also discussion in notes 32, 33, infra.
28. The official U.C.C. comment to § 4-103 notes that "agreement" as used
in § 4-103 has the meaning given to it by § 1-201(3). U.C.C. § 1-201(3) provides:
"Agreement means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their lan-
guage or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing
or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act (Sections
1-205 and 2-208). Whether an agreement has legal consequences is determined
by the provisions of this Act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts
(Section 1-103) ... "
29. The Louisiana comment to § 1-201 notes that the definitions of both
"agreement" and "contract" were deleted as being "incomplete, inaccurate,
and unnecessary."
30. Louisiana R.S. 10:1-103 differs in language from U.C.C. § 1-103. The
Official Louisiana Comment to R.S. 10:1-103 notes that the thrust of the
U.C.C. article is that the remainder of a state's law supplements the commer-
cial law in those situations not covered by the U.C.C. and that the Louisiana
version says this without limitation.
31. See discussion in note 29, supra.
32. Normally the agreement between the bank and depositor is found on
the signature card. Although the average person may not read the signature
card when he signs, Louisiana law has recognized that, in the absence of
fraud, a person signing a written document is presumed to know its contents
and may not avoid the obligations contained therein by claiming that he did
not read the instrument; Jayco Sales & Service, Inc. v. Smith, 303 So. 2d 554
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. McKay, 285 So. 2d
563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Shipp, 220 So. 2d 735
(La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 La. 132, 222 So. 2d 883 (1969); or that he is
unable to read or write, Plan Investments of Shreveport, Inc. v. Heflin, 286 So.
2d 511 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973). To avoid allegations of fraud due to unequal
bargaining positions between the bank and the customer, the bank should, in
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any loss suffered by it for paying checks properly drawn on
their account, will bind each signatory for overdrafts drawn
by the other, even though the party held liable for the
amount does not fall within one of the three exceptions
enumerated above.33
Although a legally enforceable agreement may be con-
fected, a bank is unable to avoid responsibility through such a
contract for its failure to exercise "ordinary care. '34 There-
fore, an indemnification agreement by a cosignatory obligat-
ing him to pay for all overdrafts will be ineffective when the
circumstances indicate that the bank's payment of the item
creating the overdraft is not within the bank's exercise of
ordinary care.35 The determination that a bank has failed to
exercise ordinary care is a question of fact 36 and "[e]ach case
must rest upon its own facts. ' 37 Normally, however, the
bank's overdrawing an account by charging against it a prop-
erly payable item is not a failure to exercise ordinary care; 3s
it is action approved by Article 4. 39
opening the account, require each party to the account to read or have read
to them the entire agreement with particular care being taken to inform the
customer that under the agreement each cosignatory will be responsible for
any overdraft that occurs in the account. Cf. Griffing v. Atkins, 1 So. 2d 445
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1941); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1847. See note 27, supra, and
note 33, infra.
33. See text at notes 25-27, supra. A properly drafted agreement should
contain not only an indemnification agreement but also clearly state that
each cosignatory agrees to be bound in solido for all overdrafts which arise as
a result of any item(s) which are charged against the account correctly. This
will insure that each cosignatory will be bound for the full amount of any
overdrafts in the account. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2082, 2091, and 2093.
34. U.C.C. § 4-103(1). Subsection 4-103(3) defines the term "ordinary care"
as "[a]ction or non-action approved by this Article or pursuant to Federal
Reserve regulations or operating letters . . . and, in the absence of special
instructions, action or non-action consistent with clearing house rules and
the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved by this Article. .. "
Additionally, § 4-103(4) provides that ".... approval of certain procedures by
this Article does not constitute disapproval of other procedures which may be
reasonable under the circumstances."
35. Cambridge Trust Co. v. Carney, 333 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1975).
36. In Cambridge, the court found the record sufficient to support a
jury's finding that in creating an overdraft the bank had failed to exercise
ordinary care under the circumstances. See Cooper v. Union Bank, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); First Nat'l Bank v. Stephens, 184 S.E.2d 484
(Ga. Ct. App. 1971).
37. Coroper v. Union Bank, supra note 36, at 615.
38. U.C.C. § 4-401(1).
39. U.C.C. § 4-103(3). See text of § 4-103(3) in note 34, supra.
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The Louisiana courts have never been presented with the
issue of the liability of one joint checking account signatory
for an overdraft drawn by another. The reasons for this may
be that cosignatories pay overdrafts created by another with-
out questioning their liability, law practitioners are unaware
that a cosignatory's liability may well be limited, and banks,
especially those in smaller communities, are aware that ad-
verse public relations may result from pursuing a cosignatory
beyond the account balance for an overdraft for which he was
not responsible or from which he did not benefit. Many prob-
lems can be avoided if checking account agreements are prop-
erly drafted and the banks call to the attention of their de-
positors the agreements' provisions. 40 To achieve the desired
uniformity, Louisiana courts should construe Title 10 to limit
the liability of each cosignatory to the balance of the account
in the absence of a valid indemnification agreement between
the bank and its joint account depositors, 41 or a showing of
the cosignatory's participation in the negotiation of the
check, enrichment through the creation of the overdraft, or
negligence or fraud inducing the bank to create the over-
draft.42
Malcolm S. Murchison
A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF
AIR POLLUTION LEGISLATION?-REMEDIES UNDER LOUISIANA
CIVIL CODE ARTICLES 667-669
During recent years, federal and state lawmakers have
enacted legislation aimed at protecting the purity of the at-
mosphere. The major federal legislation dealing with the con-
trol of air pollution is the Clean Air Act,' which was restruc-
tured and significantly strengthened in 1970.2 Louisiana took
action in this area in 1964, when the Louisiana Air Control
Law was enacted. 3 Both laws establish administrative agen-
40. See discussion in note 32, supra.
41. See text at notes 25-33, supra.
42. See text at notes 14-21, supra.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1857(1) (1970).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). Most of what is now the Clean
Air Act came from these 1970 amendments.
3. LA. R.S. 40:2201-16 (Supp. 1964).
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